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Treason doth never prosper; what’s the reason?
For if it prosper, none dare call it treason.
Sir John Harrington (1561-1612)
1 In February 2011, renowned Kurdish poet and singer Şivan Perwer met with Turkey’s
deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç in Germany, declaring that he would support the
Turkish administration’s efforts to find a political  solution to the Kurdish question.
Immediately afterwards, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) accused Perwer of being a
‘jash.’ Jash is a Kurdish word, literally meaning ‘donkey’s foal,’ and a highly political
term that is used to imply ‘collaborator’ and ‘traitor.’ Perwer’s prompt response was a
Youtube video in which he explained his service to Kurds and Kurdistan for decades.1
Speaking  in  Kurdish,  Perwer  condemned the  PKK leaders  for  not  knowing  Kurdish
language and concluded: ‘Be ashamed and apologize to the Kurdish people. You do not
have a right to proclaim anyone as traitor. If there are traitors, they are those who
accuse others of being traitors.’2
2 Şivan Perwer’s experience cannot be considered as an exceptional case in recent years.
Some other pro-Kurdish leftists such as Ahmet Altan, Taner Akçam, and Roni Margulies
were  among those  who received similar  allegations  for  their  ‘treacherous’  activism
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(Botî  2010).  Lately,  forty-one  Kurdish  intellectuals  issued  a  joint  declaration
condemning threats against prominent Kurdish writers and artists by the Kurdistan
Freedom Falcons  (Sabah 2011). 3 Strikingly,  the  PKK-led  Kurdish  movement 4 did  not
respond in the same way to Sezgin Tanrıkulu, another well-known figure among Kurds
and a long time human rights activist, when he joined the Republican People’s Party
(CHP).
3 Why do the pro-Kurdish activists selectively condemn some leftists of treason? Why was
Perwer, who flirted with the AKP (the Justice and Development Party) publicly accused
of being a jash, whereas Tanrıkulu, who joined the CHP, was not? This article offers a
symbolic niche perspective to study the strategic logic of labeling treason. In recent
years,  the AKP has become a major rival in defining the Kurdishness as an identity
marker,  an  unprecedented  development  in  modern Turkish  politics.  Therefore,  not
those Kurds who favor the CHP but those who flirt with the AKP breach the symbolic
line  of  authentic  Kurdish-ness  defined  by  the  PKK-led  Kurdish  activists.  Symbolic
borders  are  drawn  as  a  matter  of  symbolic  niche  overlap  in  defining  the  Kurdish
identity. Since the leftists such as Tanrıkulu are no rivals in defining Kurdish-ness, they
are not labeled as jash. The strategy of labeling treason is employed in a social process
wherein  the  collective  consciousness  (Durkheim  [1893]  1984)  is  constructed  in
opposition to ‘threats’ or ‘enemies.’ 
 
Unique Kurdish Cultural Repertoires: A Deficient
Explanation
4 Do the pro-Kurdish activists invoke the strategy of labeling treason because it strikes a
strong  cultural  chord  among  Kurds?  In  other  words,  does  treason  have  a  special
meaning in Kurdish society? Scholars who emphasize the uniqueness of the Kurdish
culture argue that jash, i.e. ‘collaborator/traitor,’ is among the most prominent Kurdish
local cultural archetypes5 (Strohmeier 2003: 116-27; Özcan 2006). For example, the most
famous Kurdish epic, Mem û  Zîn, depicts sufferings of Kurds due to their disunity, petty
jealousy, revenge, and rivalry within. Bekir,  embodying these qualities in the epic, is
one of the key figures. He betrays the ruler, and therefore, causes unbearable pains to
Mem and Zîn. Bekir is disloyal and self-serving, and thus, ‘the traitor’ (Strohmeier 2003:
30-34). Similar to some Mediterranean and Middle Eastern societies (Bourdieu 1998),
the concept of honor is central to the everyday Kurdish life and betrayal is considered
dishonorable  and  humiliating  (King  2008).  In  collective  representations,  certain
patterns of conduct are conceived of as honorable or dishonorable (Bourdieu 1998: 47).
In everyday Kurdish culture, treason is a dishonorable act and the archetype of jash has
been reproduced.
5 Proponents  of  the  cultural  uniqueness  perspective  also  perceive  the  collective
reproduction of jash to be the result of the historical trajectory of the Kurdish societal
structure.  In  his  work,  Turkey’s  Kurds:  A  Theoretical  Analysis  of  the  PKK  and  Abdullah
Öcalan, Özcan (2006: 139) argues, for example, that the tribal structure of the Kurdish
society  has  long  been  decisive  for  a  tendency  towards  collaboration  and  betrayal
among Kurds:
This undying device [Aşiret, i.e. Kurdish tribe] has echoed the uniqueness of Kurdish
existence  as  the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  Kurdish  ethnic  tradition  which  has
coagulated in its national consciousness: the Kurds’ temptation to be on the alert
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not to miss out a subordinate ‘space.’ That is, the ethnicity has a consistent tradition of
seeking not to be the leading entity but a trusty ‘right arm’ of the superior power.
Aşiret has been the only structural means of the survival in the cradle of civilization
for the ‘right arm’ - consequently ‘traitor’  - Kurds.6 
6 Noting ‘the twin heritage of Kurdishness’ as tribe and treason, the author concludes
that treason has a unique meaning among Kurds: ‘Treason is a cursed phenomenon in
every society, no matter whether it occurs within the framework of national, class or
personal relations. It is, of course, cursed in Kurdistan too. However,…it has infiltrated
the Kurdish personality considerably and is to some extent appreciated in Kurdistan- at
least within some components of the societal structure’ (2006: 153). Özcan also cites
European travelers and observers who describe ‘treacherous habits’ of Kurds (Millingen
[1870]  2009;  Soane  [1912]  2007;  Nikitin  1956).  Yet,  the  author  seems  to  contradict
himself when he argues that treason against the tribe is not tolerated among Kurds
since ‘tribal loyalty has been jealously and stubbornly preserved’ (2006: 153).
7 In  this  paper,  I  dissent  to  the  cultural  uniqueness  perspective.  The  persistent
characterization of jash and its strategic use are not exclusive to Kurdish cultural codes
or the Kurdish societal structure. Explaining dynamics of civil wars in a comparative
perspective, Kalyvas (2003; 2006: 87-110) points out that local political structures and
rivalries  among  local  groups  have  a  great  impact  on  shifting  alliances,  which  are
considered as acts of treason by rival factions. Likewise, studies indicate that patriotic
discourse  becomes  dominant  during  times  of  war  and  social  conflict  (Cohen  2008;
Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008) and when the presence of external threats to the social
body  tightens  moral  boundaries  so  that  deviance  is  not  tolerated  (Erikson  1966;
Lauderdale  1976;  Alexander,  Giesen,  and  Mast  2006).  Cohen  (2008),  for  example,
demonstrates how a discourse of treason was rampant during the Palestinian struggle
against the Zionist movement between 1917 and 1948. Moreover, many revolutionary
groups as well  as nationalist  mobilizations engage in a ‘commemoration of treason’
(Fine 2001). In the light of comparative studies, we can conclude that the ‘traitor’ as a
cultural archetype is not unique to Kurdish society; yet, it might strike a strong chord
in Kurdish collective memory because of its traditional tribal local structure as well as
its modern nationalist boundaries that are shaped by external threats.
8 As we eliminate the argument of uniqueness,  we need to reformulate our question:
Why do nationalist organizations label some nationalist activists as traitors, even when
these  activists  contribute  to  their  cause?  Comparative  studies  shed  light  on  how
strategic  priorities  of  insurgent  organizations  can  run  counter  to  the  goals  these
organizations purport to defend (Stedman 1997; Kalyvas 2006). Supporting this line of
research,  Tezcür’s  (2010)  study  analyzes  how  the  PKK’s  organizational  strategic
priorities have prevailed in the long-term goals of the pro-Kurdish movement. Tezcür
(2010: 785) utilizes organizational theory and contends that ‘the paradox of the Kurdish
nationalist  radicalization,’  i.e.  re-armament of  the PKK,  ‘during the most  ambitious
period of democratization in modern Turkish history’ could only be explained by the
PKK’s willingness to retain its hegemonic power over its constituency.
9 Introducing  the  symbolic  niche  perspective  below,  I  aim  to  expand  insights  of
organizational  theory.  Despite  its  usefulness,  the  organizational  theory  perspective
neglects  the  symbolic  dimensions  of  competition,  which  are  important  aspects  of
strategic  action.  This  article  analyzes  the  PKK-led  Kurdish  movement’s  selective
allegations of treason as an outcome of the growing competition to define the Kurdish
national  identity  and  as  the  result  of  the  fragmentation  among  the  Kurdish
‘Sold Out to the Enemy’: Emerging Symbolic Boundaries in Kurdish Politics and...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14 | 2012
3
nationalists.  Focusing  on  recent  contestations  over  Kurdish  national  identity  will
illuminate how the construction of external threats and symbolic boundary making
(Lamont and Molnár 2002) appear in the form of labeling treason and function as an
embedded local strategy in social relations (Fine 2010).
 
Symbolic Niche Overlap and Emergence of Competing
Kurdish Nationalisms
10 Niche is a key term to study competition in population biology (Roughgarden 1979).
Thinking about reproductive and survival capacity of species’ niche, ecologists suggest
that  species  might  engage  in  a  fierce  competition  as  they  have  similar  resource
requirements. According to the niche theory, niche overlap occurs when two species in a
local environment need the same resources for survival and reproduction (Pianka 1974,
2000). The niche theory has been applied to various sub-fields in sociology including
media  studies  (Dimmick  2003;  Dimmick,  Feaster,  and  Hoplamazian  2011),  social
movement  studies  (Langton  1987;  Levitsky  2007),  sociology  of  consumption  (Turow
2006), and in ethnic studies (Olzak 1992). Scholars of ethnic competition theory, for
example, propose that racial and ethnic displacement and exclusion escalate under the
conditions of niche overlap,  which refers to the intersection of living habitats where
groups have a set of potential roles for exploiting resources within (Barth 1956, 1959;
Olzak 1992). 
11 Inspired by sociological applications of the niche theory, this article offers the concept
of symbolic niche overlap to analyze the dynamics of competition in the production of
meaning. I define symbolic niche overlap as competing actors’ proximity in cultural
habitats  that  offer  symbolic  resources  to  contending  parties.  When symbolic  niche
overlap occurs, cultural habitats become the ‘arenas of competition’ (Jasper 2004) and
‘strategic action fields’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2011) in which actors engage in symbolic
contention. 
12 Kurdish politics in Turkey has witnessed a transformation of cultural habitats during
the last decade. The PKK leader Öcalan’s capture in 1999 coincided with Turkey’s EU
accession talks wherein the requirements to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria (signed in
1993) were emphasized, including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the
protection  of  minorities.  Accordingly,  Turkey  undertook  significant  reforms  to
harmonize its policies with the EU criteria following the 1999 Helsinki Summit (Balcı
2008: 89). With respect to the Kurdish issue, the EU process led to the abolishment of
the extraordinary OHAL zones [i.e.  Kurdish populated cities  that  were governed by
martial law], changes in the Turkish penal code allowing for more freedom of thought
and expression, the permission to give Kurdish names to children and to teach/learn
Kurdish at private language institutions, and regulations to allow private radio and TV
broadcasting in Kurdish dialects (Balcı 2008: 100-105).
13 The consolidation of Turkish democracy in the 2000s opened up new civil spheres in
which cultural habitats of Kurdish-ness emerge. Examples of emerging cultural spheres
for Kurdish identity includes dengbêj performances (Yücel 2009), newroz celebrations
(Watts 2010), Kurdish film festivals, fine art houses, popular art streets, youth centers,
women’s fraternity clubs, and Kurdish language schools. Although cultural spheres of
Kurdish activism such as Mesopotamia cultural centers date back to the early 1990s,
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competition over the definition of the Kurdish identity within these spheres is a recent
phenomenon. Now, these emerging cultural habitats witness a number of competing
Kurdish activists who vie for their niche in authentic Kurdish identity (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Audience of a Dengbêj performance takes a tea break in the Diyarbakır House of Dengbêj,
which has been supported by the Turkish Ministry of Tourism and Culture, June 2009.
Author’s collection
 
Challenge of Rival Kurdish Nationalisms and the
Strategy of Labeling Treason
14 A striking example of symbolic niche overlap has appeared in the cultural habitat of
the Kurdish TV channels and internet media. Since the establishment of MED-TV in
1994,  the  PKK-led  Kurdish  ethno-nationalists  have  been  heavily  involved  in  the
production  of  Kurdish  identity  through  modern  communication  technology
(Hassanpour 1998; Romano 2002). In recent years, however, the ethno-nationalists are
not the sole players in the field. Surprising to many and called as ‘a great revolution’ by
some Kurds,7 the Turkish state launched an official Kurdish TV channel,  TRT Şeş,  in
2009. Encouraged by the foundation of the official TV station, private enterprises took
remarkable steps. Kurdish supporters of the pro-Islamic Gülen movement, for example,
opened  Dünya-TV,  which  is  broadcasting  in  Kurdish  and  entirely  devoted  to  the
Kurdish culture and folklore.8 
15 Likewise,  new social  media outlets  that target a  Kurdish audience are very diverse.
Kurdish Islamist Hizbullah’s websites are quite professional in challenging their ethno-
nationalist counterparts.9 The Hizbullah’s cultural activism in Kurdish art, literature,
and music  has  been growing  since  2004  (Gurbuz  forthcoming).10 In  addition  to  the
Hizbullah, there are various Kurdish Islamist groups that publicly denounce the state
policies over the Kurdish issue. As an Islamic voice, Mizgîn magazine (2004-2011), for
example, published many articles (in Kurdish as well as in Turkish) calling for a radical
change in the Turkish state structure.  Therefore the authors of  the magazine were
constantly harassed by the state agencies (Figure 2).11
16 Regarding Kurdish leftist nationalism, online platforms such as Nasname and Kurdistan
Aktuel have become centers of attraction among Kurds. In these virtual platforms, one
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could find many intellectual criticisms of the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan from
various Marxist  and socialist  perspectives.  Interviews with İsmail  Beşikçi  and other
independent radical leftists are frequently featured and the PKK’s renunciation of an
independent Kurdistan is strongly criticized.12 Hence, new developments in the cultural
habitat of Kurdish social media challenge the PKK-led ethno-nationalist monopoly over
the Kurdish identity.
                 
Figure 2. Covers of Mizgîn in which independent Kurdistan (issue 55) and a Turkish-Kurdish
federation state (issue 56) are proposed. The issues were confiscated by the Turkish authorities and
legal investigations were held.
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17 In  this  regard,  defining  Kurdish-ness  and  Kurdish  national  identity  has  become  a
contested  symbolic  sphere  in  which  various  actors  play  in  a  field of  meaning
production (cf. Becker 1982). Symbolic niche overlap in Kurdish media has led to fights
for  authentic Kurdish-ness  and  a  key  strategy  to  sustain  the  authenticity  claims  is
labeling  the  actions  of  others  as  treason.  In  other  words,  rival  Kurdish  activists’
proximity  in  the  cultural  habitat,  making  use  of  the  Kurdish  language,  symbols,
historical figures, and local narratives has translated into a debate over who make up
genuine/authentic Kurds and who betray, i.e. the traitors. The Kurdish revolutionaries
especially  target  those  Kurds  who  appear  in  TRT  Şeş,  i.e.  the  official  Kurdish  TV
channel (Gurbuz 2009). Bahoz Erdal, the chief of HPG, the PKK’s military flank, told ROJ
TV that ‘anyone who participates in the TRT Şeş  is a “jash”.’13 The PKK-led Kurdish
activists often call TRT Şeş as ‘TRT Jash’ pejoratively.
18 As a cultural space, TRT Şeş has become one of the red zones or enemy zones. Of course,
it is only one among many. Zealous statement of Emine Ayna, co-chairperson of the
DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi),14 in a speech delivered in Varto (December 2, 2008)
indicates  the  construction  of  red  zones  for  authentic  Kurdish-ness:  ‘No  one  who
becomes a candidate of the AKP can say, “I am a Kurd.” This is not acceptable because
the AKP’s policies deny the Kurds. Whoever becomes an AKP candidate is not a Kurd
even if s/he says “I am a Kurd”’ (quoted in Tezcür 2009). 
19 Next section discusses attempts to re-draw symbolic borders through the strategy of
labeling treason. As symbolic niche overlap occurs, multiple actors employ symbolic
resources  of  Kurdish-ness  in  variety  of  ways  and  this  very  complexity  leads  to
‘ontological  insecurity’  (Ostertag  2010)  for  the  rival  players.  Thus,  the  Kurdish
revolutionaries’ labeling efforts are closely related with their quest to re-construct the
collective conscience boundaries (Durkheim [1893] 1984; Alexander 1988; Gurbuz 2008).
 
Explaining the Link between Labeling Treason and
Symbolic Boundaries
20 Labeling treason is not a mundane, spontaneous act;  instead, it  is  a very calculated
collective  behavior  and  an  effective  mobilization  strategy.  Given  its  ritualistic
character,  the very act of labeling is  a double edge sword. On the one hand, it  can
contribute to social conformity with the claiming party. On the other hand, however, it
has a potential risk to initiate a harmful dispute within ranks of the the claiming party
or its followers. This risk becomes greater if the labeled individual is a very respected
or famous personality, such as Şivan Perwer is for many Kurds.
21 This particular concern is very important in order to grasp the selectivity of the act of
labeling treason. The question ‘whom should be labeled’ entails a collective decision-
making. The cases of Şivan Perwer and Sezgin Tanrıkulu might be illuminating since
they are both well-respected Kurds. Why has Perwer been declared a traitor and not
Tanrıkulu? Our earlier discussion over symbolic niche overlap provides a useful outlook
here. Perwer’s relation with the AKP is quite different than Tanrıkulu’s relation with
the CHP. Perwer’s relation to the AKP was confined to a single meeting with a high-
rank AKP official, whereas Tanrıkulu joined the CHP as party member. Yet, it is the AKP
that is seen as a niche competitor over the definition of the Kurdish identity, whereas
the CHP is not perceived as a rival player.15 
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22 Thus,  in  order  to  eliminate  potential  risks,  those  who  have  the  power  of  labeling
specifically target niche competitors. Especially the rival actors that claim the Kurdish
cultural  space  are  portrayed  as  snaky/masked  enemies.  Through  mechanisms  of
‘demonization’  and ‘the construction of  non-personhood’  (Ducharme and Fine 1995;
Fine 2001), the Kurdish constituency is invited to be a part of a ‘ritual performance’
(Alexander 2006) against the enemies of Kurds and the jash,  i.e. traitor/collaborator.
Specifically, the TRT Şeş, Dünya-TV, and similar rival Kurdish platforms are coded as
‘the enemy zones’ and those who contribute, in any way and regardless of how big or
small their contribution might be, are regarded as jash.16 These symbolic boundaries are
meant to make the Kurdish lay audience see how some Kurds (especially those who are
leftist activists) are making a huge mistake when they consciously dive –or accidently
are trapped into- these enemy zones. Bergesen’s (1977) notes on demonization through
the construction of sacred zones are very illuminating in this regard:
Political witch hunts are the ritual mechanisms that transform individuals, groups,
organizations or cultural artifacts from things of this world into actors within a
mythical  universe.  These  rituals  are  the  social  “hooks”  that  keep  sacred
transcendent forces present in the lives of ordinary people and relevant for
everyday  institutional  transactions...Trivial  activity  is  ritually  transformed  into
actions  of  large  historical  forces.  Using  one  kind  of  fertilizer  or  another  on  a
communal farm is transformed into the mythical world of “taking the capitalist
road”  or  “following  the  socialist  road.”  Reading  a  book  or  seeing  a  play  is
transformed into being “poisoned by bourgeois thoughts” or being a “communist
sympathizer.” Correspondence with friends abroad can be transformed into acts
“restoring  capitalism,”  making  one  an  “imperialist  agent”  and
“counterrevolutionary.”
23 Demonization as a ritual mechanism17 has a particular logic when it comes to jash, the
one who collaborates with the enemy. In the process of labeling treason, the PKK-led
Kurdish activists demonize the greater enemy to indicate unacceptability of the jash’s
behavior. As mentioned above, this particular strategy aims to remove potential in-
group debates and internal strife. A striking example is the Kurdish revolutionaries’
discourses  about  ‘the  Turkish  deep  state’  and  their  ‘collaborators’  (Gurbuz  2010).
Narrations of Abdullah Öcalan, the movement’s jailed leader, are quite remarkable to
be quoted in full despite its length: 
24 In elimination of Ergenekon,18 the United States had a major impact. Having a new plan
for the Kurds, the USA wanted to realize its aims. Yet, through an active resistance,
these people [the Ergenekon convicts] did not let the USA realize its Kurdish project.
The USA does not want that the PKK to remain as it is; and therefore, they develop
conspiracies  (against  us).  Those  who  were  detained  in  the  Ergenekon  case  are
professional soldiers who have been trained by the USA since 1960s as intelligence and
counter-guerilla officers. The USA told them, ‘You screwed me up!’ and later, put them
with the garbage. Now, the USA wants to realize its (Kurdish) project through soft-
Islam… I’ve become aware of their tricks and games; and, I’ve tried to tear down (all
these tricks). That’s why I’m here now: I was an obstacle for the realization of their
games.  My  arrival  (to  İmralı  Prison)  has  changed  many  things  in  the  Middle  East.
Saddam’s removal followed my exile. In this way, they have controlled Iraq. Later, they
eliminated Al-Fatah. Now, it’s  HAMAS’s turn. Soon after,  they will  remove Assad by
using the same technique,  which means that Syria will  be the next one.  They have
similar plans for Turkey. So, I warn the government that they should not fall into their
traps. I say that we should solve our problems internally. An official who visited me
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some time ago was telling me that we should solve this (Kurdish) problem from within.
I said ‘yes’ by warning him: ‘do not try to use me or trick me; you would never succeed.’
They could not  do it.  They did not  have a  realistic  and permanent  solution to  the
Kurdish question, neither did they have a vision to understand the Kurdish issue or the
ability to solve it…One of the reasons for the USA’s elimination of them [the Ergenekon
generals] was their approach to me and the PKK as well as their policies on the Kurdish
question. That’s why I’m portrayed as someone who has relations with the Ergenekon.
In  fact,  I  did  never  ever  collaborate  with  them  since  they  had  never  consistent,
realistic, and convincing solutions to the Kurdish question. Similarly, they associate the
PKK with Ergenekon. These forces, in fact, build relations with certain individuals in
the PKK such as Çürükkaya and Şemdin Sakık in order to establish control over the
PKK… I did not let them take power over me and the PKK. Yet, by employing the same
type of tricks, they managed to get Baykal at the top of the CHP (People’s Republican
Party),  and  thereby,  eliminated  the  leftist  movement.  Likewise,  they  got  the  MHP
(Nationalist  Action Party)  under control  by making Bahçeli  the leader of  the party.
Against the alliance of the MHP and the CHP, the USA has pushed forward its soft Islam
project,  and therefore,  has  controlled all  sorts  of  conservative right  movements  by
making them circle around the AKP and Erdoğan.19
25 In Öcalan’s narrative, we see how the PKK is portrayed as the ultimate organization to
support Kurdish people and their rights against evil,  dark, too powerful,  and global
forces. The PKK leader has two major arguments in his narration:
1. The PKK is  an independent  movement  that  has  never  collaborated with the  enemies  of
Kurds despite their  attempts.  Those who openly criticized the PKK among them ex-PKK
members such as Şemdin Sakık and Selim Çürükkaya, were also ‘traitors’  to the Kurdish
people since they collaborated with the ‘deep state.’ 
2. The criminalization of Turkish deep state (through the case of Ergenekon) is  a strategic
choice of the United States: therefore, Kurds should not be deceived by the AKP’s reformist
policies.  Now,  the  emerging  menace  for  Kurds  is  the  American-supported  ‘soft  Islam,’
therefore, the AKP and its supporters are sinister, masked enemies.
26 When they are read together with his other ‘meeting notes,’ it becomes clear to the
audience that Öcalan’s narratives put almost all the other major players in the Kurdish
sphere, namely, the AKP, the Gülen movement, the Hizbullah as well as Kurdish leftists
who betrayed the PKK, on one straight line. For him all of them are compromised by
the Turkish deep state, which has been portrayed as an American-backed imperialist
power machine. In line with Öcalan, Kurdish political activists vigorously contribute to
the re-drawing of the symbolic borders by stressing the demon-like,  dark, insidious
character of the deep state that uses Kurds against their own Kurdish people. ‘If you cut
off  the  tail  of  a  snake  without  crushing  its  head,  it  becomes  more  dangerous’
commented Ahmet Türk, co-chairperson of the DTP, on the Ergenekon operations: ‘The
“covered” face of the state wants to sweep its filth under the carpet’ (quoted in Olson
2009:  131).  In  a  similar  vein,  Emine  Ayna,  underlined  how  the  AKP’s  Ergenekon
investigations are part of a global Western plan in the Middle East (Olson 2009: 25).
Hence,  while zealously defending the necessity of  Ergenekon trials  and many other
liberating reforms, Kurdish politicians emphasize the sinister character of these actions
held by the AKP. This way they want to re-draw symbolic borders.
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Figure 3. Supporters of the AKP join the party’s election rally in Urfa, May 2011.
Author’s collection
 
Competing Kurdish Nationalisms and Labeling
Treason: Implications for the Future of Kurdish
Politics
27 Why  was  Şivan  Perwer  labeled  despite  his  enormous  popularity  among  Kurdish
nationalists? This article suggests that the act of labeling treason should be studied as a
collective symbolic strategy. Similar to some other Kurdish leftists, Perwer had passed
the  line  and  stepped  in  the  red  zones  by  negotiating  the  AKP,  the  PKK’s  main
competitor.  Recent  developments  in  Kurdish  cultural  sphere  have  transformed  the
Kurdish  politics  as  a  multi-player  game  in  which  symbolic  niche  overlaps  occur.
Labeling treason appears to be a useful and risky strategy for the PKK-led activists by
which they seek to re-draw the Kurdish symbolic boundaries that have been in rapid
transformation.  It  is  functional  since  it  re-constructs  an  awareness  of  a  collective
identity through social control. It is risky because it could mount to a growing criticism
of those who enjoy the power of labeling. As reflected in Öcalan’s narratives, those who
have the power of labeling try to eliminate the potential risks through constructions of
red  zones  and  non-personhood.  In  this  particular  process,  pro-Kurdish  activists
demonize the rival players such as the pro-Islamic AKP instead of other major political
parties such as the MHP or the CHP. Why? To re-assert the PKK’s prominent position
among  Kurds.  As  the  concept  of  symbolic  niche  overlap  suggests,  the  PKK-led
movement  looses  its  hegemonic  power  due  to  increasing  competition  in  the  pro-
Kurdish field. 
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28 Hence,  from  a  comparative  sociological  perspective,  one  could  foresee  that  the
increasing  diversity  in  Kurdish  nationalism(s)  would  eliminate  the  PKK’s  monopoly
over Kurdish identity (see, for example, Mees 2003 for the case of ETA, and Todd 2010
for the IRA). Yet, as long as the Kurdish constituency perceives itself as torn between
the Turkish state and the PKK, and thus,  as  too vulnerable,  the process of  labeling
treason has a strategic value. As one Kurdish writer who engaged in conversations with
some leftist political activists in pro-Kurdish parties observed, many leftist Kurds are
still very afraid of being labeled as ‘traitor’: ‘Imagine: you dedicate your life for a cause
(in such a way that) you get imprisoned at times. Yet, one day, some people erase your
life and declare you as “traitor.” At that moment, you are finished, not only politically
but also socially. It’s because the patent of Kurdish-ness is under the sway of “those
who could proclaim traitors”!’ (Matur 2011).
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NOTES
1.  Link to the  video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FcDnLQBzs10
2.  ‘Perwer:  Asıl  Hain  PKK,’  Radikal,  February  17,  2011.URL:  http://www.dha.com.tr/sivan-
perwer-pkkya-cevap-verdi-son-dakika-haberi_142796.html (accessed  March  29,  2011).  After
Perwer’s public debate with the PKK, tensions continued to grow. PKK supporters attempted to
sabotage Perwer’s concert in Netherlands, and consequently, Perwer reacted with the following
words:  ‘Save your children and let  them be educated (so that)  they should not be like these
clowns who assault their own people,’ See ‘Şivan Perver PKK’ya Sert Çıktı,’  Radikal,  March 30,
2011. 
3.  The PKK leaders deny the direct connection with the TAK. Yet, there is no doubt that the TAK
is one of the SMOs (social movement organization) in the PKK-led Kurdish movement.
4.  The pro-Kurdish movement in Turkey is  led by the PKK despite it  has a variety of forms
including pro-Kurdish political parties. Thus, in this study, the PKK-led movement does not refer
to the militant PKK guerillas solely; rather it refers to broader pro-Kurdish activism. For a similar
approach, see Watts 2010.
5.  For cultural archetypes in sociology of culture scholarship, see Klapp 1962, Griswold 1983,
Meyer 2003, Lizardo 2009. 
6.  Emphases in the original.
7.  Author’s interview with Abdurrahman Kurt, Kurdish deputy for Diyarbakır (from the AKP,
Justice and Development Party). Grand Turkish National Assembly, Ankara, June 2009.   
8.  The Dünya-TV aims to block Kurdish separatist propaganda by reaching out the Kurds in their
native language. In this sense,  it  goes parallel  with the TRT-Şeş,  and therefore,  puts a major
challenge to the pro-Kurdish ethno-nationalist channels. Author’s interview with Remzi Ketenci,
the director of the Dünya-TV, Gaziantep, May 2011. 
9. See,  for example,  Doğru Haber and İlke Haber Ajansı websites.  Other prominent Hizbullah
websites include Huseyni Sevda and İslâmi Davet.
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10.  Author’s interview with M. Ali Oğuz, one of the prominent singers of the Hizbullah, Istanbul,
July 2009. The Hizbullah’s Kurdish magazine, Banga Ḧeq Ji Kelhaamed: Kovara İslamî Çandî u Hunerî,
features  Kurdish  literary  works.  Unlike  the  group’s  newspaper,  Doğru  Haber,  and  monthly
magazine, İnzar Dergisi, the Kelhaamed does not cover global Islamic political trends.
11.  The magazine decided to shutdown as of January 1, 2011. The primary reason was the arrests
of the magazine’s main figures (in May 2010) on the charge of establishing a clandestine group,
Kurdistan Islamic Revolutionary Movement, which aims to establish a Kurdish Islamic state through
an  armed  struggle.  See  ‘Mizgin  dergisi'ne  baskın,  47  kişi  gözaltında’  URL:  http://
www.haberlink.com/haber.php?query=49099#.UPUgyPL0ftk (accessed April 10, 2011). 
12. İsmail Beşikçi has been a well respected leftist intellectual (Bruinessen 2005), and his harsh
criticisms of  Öcalan and the PKK are very influential  among Kurdish audience.  His  views on
Kurdish right for self-determination and an independent state are widely circulated. ‘Abdullah
Öcalan,’ remarks Beşikçi, ‘recently said that “I am a free individual and thus, I oppose the nature
of the state as an institution since the state as a construct is a mean of oppression.” He also says
that “I have nothing to do establishing a state”… Although Öcalan often repeats his opposition to
the state as an institution; he never had a word against a real, materialized state that oppresses
Kurds each moment every single day… It seems that Öcalan has no problem with Turkish, Arab,
and Irani states. He only does not want Kurds having their own state, which is the very claim of
the Republic of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.’ See ‘İsmail Beşikçi : Ben Kürt milliyetçisi değilim
demek bir zaaftır,’ August 23, 2009, URL: http://www.nasname.com/tr/4638.html (accessed April
9, 2011).
13.  ‘PKK Spokesman: During Elections in Diyarbakır Kurds Give a Lesson to Erdoğan,’ January 4,
2009. URL: http://www.kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=15328 (accessed May 10, 2009).
14.  DTP was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court in December 2009, having a similar
destiny with its predecessors in the past (the Democracy Party, DEP; the People’s Democracy
Party, HADEP; the Democratic People’s Party, DEHAP). Since then, the PKK-led Kurdish ethno-
nationalists have united around the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which has been active
since 2008.
15.  Close relations between the CHP and the DTP during the 2011 general election campaign
sustains this claim. See ‘CHP-BDP Yakınlaşmasına Kılıçdaroğlu Yorumu,’ Radikal, May 27, 2011.
16.  Author’s  interview  with  a  Kurdish  writer  and  journalist  who  did  not  want  her  name
published. Istanbul, June 2009.  
17.  Ducharme and Fine (1995) explain how Benedict Arnold was publicly demonized after being
cursed a traitor. In Philadelphia, where Arnold served as military governor, a two-headed figure
of Arnold was carried through the streets, and a figure of the devil holding a purse filled with
gold to the traitor’s ear and a pitchfork to his back, stood behind (Ducharme and Fine 1995).
18.  The Turkish deep state is popularly called as Ergenekon.  Named after a mythical valley in
Central Asia, the Ergenekon is a secular ultranationalist organization. The myth of Ergenekon
narrates how a she-wolf rescued the Turkish nation in a most desperate situation. Some scholars
noted how the modern Turkish Republic has generated the Ergenekon myth in its early years as
trying to establish a secular nationhood that is disconnected from the Ottoman past (Türköne
2009).  As  being  a  secular  ultranationalist  network,  Ergenekon  has  justified  its  extrajudicial
activities and violence in the name of the fatherland (Kaya 2009: 102) and has been very active in
the Eastern Anatolian cities where the Kurdish population is dense (ESI Report 2008). In June
2007,  a  legal  case  was opened to  investigate  the organization.  The state  prosecutors  defined
Ergenekon  as  a  collusive  terrorist  organization  within  the  Turkish  state, rooted  mainly  in
Turkish armed forces, constituted of a wide network of individuals from the military, judiciary,
bureaucracy, parliament, media, intelligent agencies, academia, and civil society unions (Kaya
2009: 105).
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19. Öcalan’s talks from his cell are regularly recorded by his lawyers and widely distributed in
Kurdish  constituency  as  Görüşme  Notları,  i.e.  the  Meeting  Notes.  The  PKK  affiliated  online
platforms such as Rojaciwan and Firat News provide the Meeting Notes at full length. Translation
by the author.
ABSTRACTS
Why do the pro-Kurdish activists selectively condemn renowned leftists of  treason? Why are
allegations of treachery so ubiquitous? Existing literature suggests that the Kurdish community
would be particularly receptive to allegations of treason because of its tribal structure and strong
cultural codes. Drawing on the niche theory, this article argues contrary that competition over
Kurdish nationalism is the key to explain the growing symbolic politics. Especially in the past
decade, the PKK’s monopoly over Kurdish identity has been challenged strongly by both Islamic
and leftist  groups.  Analyzing recent  contestations  over  Kurdish national  identity,  the  article
illuminates how the construction of external threats and symbolic boundary making appear in
the form of labeling treason.
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